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Abstract
We argue that Causal Decision Theory (CDT) is no worse off than Evi-
dential Decision Theory (EDT) in handling entanglement, regardless of one’s
preferred interpretation of quantum mechanics. In recent works, Ahmed
(2014) and Ahmed and Caulton (2014) have claimed the opposite; we argue
that they are mistaken. Bell-type experiments are not instances of Newcomb
problems, so CDT and EDT do not diverge in their recommendations. We
highlight the fact that a Causal Decision Theorist should take all lawlike
correlations into account, including potentially acausal entanglement cor-
relations. This paper also provides a brief introduction to CDT with a
motivating “small” Newcomb problem. The main point of our argument
is that quantum theory does not provide grounds for favouring EDT over
CDT.
1 Introduction
In two recent works (Ahmed 2014; Ahmed and Caulton 2014), Arif Ahmed ar-
gues that Causal Decision Theory (CDT) faces a serious challenge from quantum
mechanics. He argues that the EPR correlations—correlations predicted by quan-
tum mechanics to obtain between entangled pairs of particles, which have been
experimentally verified to an extremely high degree of precision by the so-called
Bell experiments1—can be used to develop a decision problem in which CDT and
Evidential Decision Theory (EDT) give diverging answers. As such, Ahmed char-
acterizes this as a version of Newcomb’s problem. Newcomb problems are typically
defined as problems for which one’s actions are evidentially relevant to their cre-
dences, but not causally relevant.
Ahmed and Caulton (2014) set up betting scenarios based on two devices, A
and B. Each has three settings, 1, 2, and 3, and outputs for each setting are binary
1See Giustina et al. 2015 for a notable recent example.
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(‘Yes’ and ‘No’). The observationally deduced facts pertaining to the setup are as
follows:
1. whenever the switches on A and B are on the same setting, the devices
display the same output;
2. when the switches on A and B are on different settings, they display the
same output 25% of the time, and different outputs 75% of the time; and
3. for each individual device, the output on any setting is random—50% ‘Yes’
and 50% ‘No’ (Ahmed and Caulton 2014, cf. p. 4317).
This sort of setup can be realized with entangled quantum systems. Accord-
ing to three possible acausal interpretations of entanglement—corresponding to
acausal denials of the no conspiracy assumption (response (A2) in (Ahmed and
Caulton 2014)), outcome independence (B2), and parameter independence (C2),
respectively—Ahmed and Caulton claim that betting scenarios can be constructed
such that CDT and EDT diverge, and CDT and quantum theory diverge. They
conclude that this is reason to reject CDT, since it gives differing recommendations
to seemingly identical theories in the form of differing interpretations of quantum
nonlocality.2
In this paper, we will analyze the details of Ahmed’s position, and argue that
his conclusion is not sound. First, Bell experiments are not Newcomb-type prob-
lems: one’s actions are neither evidentially nor causally relevant to experimental
outcomes. In cases like this, EDT and CDT recommend the same actions. We
introduce CDT and EDT in Section 2, and provide an example of a true New-
comb problem. In attempting to make the EPR setup a Newcomb-type problem,
Ahmed assumes a strict understanding of CDT for which acausal correlations can-
not be used. Violations of Bell inequalities have been experimentally verified, and
we argue in Section 3 that both evidential and causal decision theorists should
use the experimental evidence to set their credences. Finally, Ahmed imposes
constraints on certain interpretations of quantum theory which lead to scenarios
in which an agent bets against Bell inequality violations. In Section 4 we show
that these constraints are sufficient to limit the set of possible credence functions
to Bell-factorizable ones. Anybody who accepts Ahmed’s constraints—including
evidential decision theorists—would set their credences against the experimental
evidence. We end with a brief conclusion.
2Cavalcanti (2010) makes a similar argument, though his conclusion is slightly different. He
claims that the failure of CDT plus acausal interpretations of entanglement in EPR-type betting
scenarios means that either CDT is false, or that CDT is capable of making a practical distinction
between what were previously thought to be empirically equivalent metaphysical theses.
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2 CDT and Newcomb–Type Problems
CDT was first proposed by Robert Stalnaker in correspondence with David Lewis
(Stalnaker 1980), and was first popularized by Allan Gibbard and William L.
Harper (1978). It was developed as a way of reconciling decision theory with a
decision problem first introduced by Robert Nozick, called Newcomb’s Problem
(Nozick 1969).3 CDT is an approach to rational decision problems. Gibbard and
Harper contrasted CDT with Evidential Decision Theory. EDT seeks to maximize
the expected utility EU of an action A, construed as the welcomeness of the news
that one is about to perform the act. The utility w of the action–outcome pair is
weighted by one’s credence in the outcome, conditional on the action A. Formally,
EU(A) =
∑
i
Cr (Si|A)w (A&Si) . (1)
CDT, on the other hand, weights the utility w by one’s credences in the subjunctive
conditionals A→ Si, to be read as “If I were to perform A then Si would obtain.”
Formally,
EU(A) =
∑
i
Cr (A→ Si)w (A&Si) . (2)
In cases where one’s actions are evidentially irrelevant to the outcome, Cr (Si|A) =
Cr (Si), and where the outcome does not depend on one’s actions, Cr (A→ Si) =
Cr (Si). Then the expected utility reduces from (1) or (2) to
EU(A) =
∑
i
Cr (Si)w (A&Si) , (3)
in the former and latter cases, respectively. Importantly, if one’s actions are both
evidentially irrelevant and independent of the outcome, then EDT and CDT make
the same recommendations: maximize expected utility according to (3).
A fundamental constraint on an agent’s credence in the subjunctive conditional
is that it equal the agent’s evaluation of the chance of outcome Si conditional on
A.4 That is, the agent must, when possible, set his credence in the subjunctive
conditional Cr (A→ Si) to the chance that Si will obtain, given A: Ch (Si|A).
How the agent evaluates the objective conditional chance Ch (Si|A) will depend
on the circumstances. In the EPR experiments at issue, there is now overwhelming
evidence that the objective chances agree with those predicted by quantum theory.
This point will be relevant for our critique of Ahmed’s argument.
3Nozick credits the physicist William Newcomb with the original formulation of the problem.
4See e.g. (Skyrms 2013). Chance here can be viewed as objective and prior to the agent’s
credences, or epistemic and built out of a systematization of credences.
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2.1 Small Newcomb Problem
The original version of Newcomb’s problem has been extensively discussed in the
decision theory literature.5 The details of the problem are rather contrived. As
such, there is interest in other, more realistic Newcomb–type problems which share
the essential decision-theoretic features of Newcomb’s Problem.
Consider this “small” Newcomb–type problem, where the payoffs are small
enough for ordinary people to have clear intuitions, and where the “predictor”
is not some unexplained, mysterious being, perhaps with supernatural predictive
powers (as in the original Newcomb Problem), but only a personality tester whose
predictions are backed up by a track record which you know.6 You are faced with
two boxes; one is open and you can see that it contains a fifty-dollar bill. The
other is closed, but you are informed that it contains either a thousand dollars
or nothing. Two days ago, you completed the questions on a personality test
developed by the personality tester. You now know that if, on the basis of your
test performance, the tester predicted you would take only the closed box then the
thousand dollars was put in it and if the prediction was that you would take both
boxes then nothing was put in the closed box.
p1B p2B
1B $1, 000 $0
2B $1, 050 $50
Figure 1: Payoff structure for the Small Newcomb Problem.
Suppose the track record of the personality tester, which you know, would sup-
port your assigning rational conditional credences Cr(p1B|1B) and Cr(p2B|2B)
as both at least as high as .6. If you are using EDT, this would lead to your
choosing 1B.7 However, even if your choice of 1B would give you evidence that you
had been scored as a one-boxer, it would give you no reason to suppose that you
could increase your chance of obtaining the $1, 000 by foregoing the $50.8 This
dominance argument supports CDT’s sure thing argument for 2B.
5See (Lewis 1981) and (Weirich 2016) for accessible introductions.
6This is a version of an example that appeared in (Harper 1993, pp. 84–85).
7If utilities are linear with these amounts of money, as they often are for modest amounts
like this, then evidential decision theory will recommend one box so long as Cr(p1B|1B) −
Cr(p1B|2B) is greater than 50/1000, or .05.
8This would clearly be what Cusbert (2017) would identify as a case of ordinary ‘forwards’
causation.
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3 CDT and Causation
It is clear that what is relevant in the example above is that the choice of 1B or
2B could have no causal influence on whether the predictor put the $1,000 in the
closed box. But CDT doesn’t rely on causation in any metaphysically significant
sense.9 Ahmed seems to read too much into the name “Causal Decision Theory.”
We note that Gibbard and Harper (1978) did not use the term. It was coined and
popularized by Lewis (1981).
Although causal talk has been present since the beginning of this discussion,
we argue that it is best understood as a proxy for talk of dependencies that exist
in nature. In short, what is relevant for CDT is not the presence of causation in
any metaphysically significant sense, but the presence of physical dependencies. Of
course, cases where there is a causal connection between an action and an outcome
will be cases where such dependencies exist. But one of the most fundamental
lessons of quantum mechanics is that there are physical dependencies that exist in
nature, which can be perfectly well described by our best physical theories, which
may nonetheless be acausal.
As shown in equation (2), the relevant quantity to evaluate is one’s credence
in the subjunctive conditional, and these are evaluated in terms of the conditional
chance Ch(Si|A).10 Skyrms (2013) has shown that the chance view of subjunctive
conditionals agrees with the possible world semantics, and helpfully generalizes
past strict causation by using conditional chance. These chances can be viewed
as objective or epistemic chances. In the context of quantum theory, an objective
view of the chances would start with (“bare”) quantum theory to generate the
conditional chances, while an epistemic view would take the experimental tests of
Bell inequality violations as evidence for the correct chances. The loophole-free
tests (Giustina et al. 2015) should be enough to convince most that the chance of
violating the Bell inequalities is approximately one, so we end up with practically
indistinguishable chances as when we start from quantum theory. In either case,
causation is unnecessary for getting at the chances predicted by quantum theory,
and so something broader than causal relationships may be used in CDT.
As we noted above, the central prescription of CDT is that one should set
9In fact, when analyzing counterfactuals for which P (A→ S) 6= P (S|A), Gibbard and Harper
(1978, p. 127) make reference only to worlds that “obey physical laws”, not to worlds in which
causation plays any role.
10As mentioned in (Ahmed and Caulton 2014, fn. 21)—and quoted below—Ahmed grants
that CDT should deal with conditional chance in this way, and it thus appears clear that our
interpretations of what CDT is do not differ drastically. However, here he views conditional
chance as revealing only causal dependencies: “the extent to which the conditional chance of
Y on X, Ch(Y |X), exceeds the unconditional chance Ch(Y ) of Y, reflects the extent to which
the occurrence of X causally promotes the occurrence of Y ” (Ahmed and Caulton 2014, p.4328,
emphasis original).
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one’s credences in accord with what one believes the chances to be. In the EPR
experiments, we now have extraordinary empirical evidence that quantum theory
gets the chances right. So CDT will prescribe that we set our credences in accord
with these chances. In the original formulation of the position, “cause” was chosen
as the most robust indicator for the existence of physical dependencies. But as
we’ve learned from quantum nonlocality, cause cannot be the final word on where
dependencies exist in nature.
As we’ll describe in more detail below, while it’s true that the notion of a
controllable causal connection between the settings or outcomes on the one side
of an entangled pair and the outcomes on the other is not a viable explanation of
the EPR correlations, on pain of signaling,11 this ‘acausality’ is not as powerful
an assumption as Ahmed seems to be supposing. There are robust statistical
dependencies in these setups that have been identified and described by quantum
mechanics. These are relevant for reasoning using CDT.
To reiterate, CDT by itself imposes no particular structure on the conditional
chances. In the context of Bell–type experiments, agents familiar with quantum
mechanics should use the theory to generate the relevant chances. One can hold
that the relevant chances are the quantum ones, either by rejecting the assumption
that spacelike separated events are causally independent (as the de Broglie-Bohm
theory or any other deterministic theory would have it it) or by accepting that there
are lawlike correlations that are not causal. Though this latter move may seem
counterintuitive, it has been defended as the best way to reconcile nonlocality and
relativity (see, for example, Shimony (1984), Redhead (1987), Ghirardi (2010), and
Myrvold (2016)). Predictions of quantum theory are not interpretation-dependent.
Given the robust experimental evidence for violations of the Bell inequalities, ac-
ceptance of quantum theory is not even necessary in order to set one’s credences in
a non-Bell-factorizable way. Supposing only that the agent is aware of the evidence,
their credences should overwhelmingly favour violations of the Bell inequalities in
EPR-type setups. On this view, the evidence is interpreted as providing frequency
data as evidence for the underlying chances.
4 CDT and the EPR Correlations
As we’ve argued above, EDT and CDT do not diverge in Bell-type experiments.
In trying to separate the two, Ahmed relies on a misconstrual of the constraints
11Causal connections are allowed, so long as the agent does not have epistemic access to the
detailed state of the world. In the de Broglie–Bohm theory, for example, the choice of experiment
on one particle has a causal influence on the distant system. However, an agent cannot have
precise knowledge of the true state of the world, and must therefore average over all compatible
states. In effect, this averaging washes out any causal connection present in the agent’s credences.
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on subjunctive conditionals in CDT. Both causal and evidential decision theorists
ought to assume that the relevant chances in Bell-type setups are those predicted
by quantum theory. This is sufficient to undermine Ahmed’s argument against
CDT; EDT and CDT recommend taking the same bets. Ahmed and Caulton
(2014) further impose certain “theoretical assumptions” on acausal interpretations
of nonlocality. To understand how this argument works, we will need to describe
Ahmed and Caulton’s argument in some detail.12
The strategy of their paper is to show that on three of the eight “theoretical
assumptions” identified by the authors as reasonable explanations for the existence
of the EPR correlations, the EU-score generated by CDT will differ from that
generated by EDT. It is this feature of the EPR correlations that the authors use
as the justification for the claim that the EPR correlations represent a Newcomb–
type problem. Then, the authors claim, if one gives any non-zero credence to the
possibility that any one of these theoretical assumptions is the true explanation for
the EPR correlations, then they can construct a betting scenario in which CDT
will recommend betting against the well-established probabilistic predictions of
quantum theory.
In each of the three theoretical assumptions in question, the explanation for the
EPR correlations is “acausal”. They are characterized by the authors as follows:
A2 (deny the no conspiracy assumption): “...[T]he correlation between
the setting on the receivers and the prior state of the particles is
acausal...” (Ahmed and Caulton 2014, p. 4319)
B2 (deny outcome independence): “...[T]here is a non-causal corre-
lation between the hidden variables associated with the particles [...]
there is no causal connection underlying this correlation, so that any
reading ready on any receiver is in fact causally independent of any
reading on any other receiver.” (Ahmed and Caulton 2014, p. 4320)
C2 (deny parameter independence): “Also to be included in (C2) is
any view that denies causation for at least some instances of the EPR
experiment. Like (B2), the statistical correlation is treated as brute,
i.e. non-causal.” (Ahmed and Caulton 2014, p. 4322)
The authors then rely on this assumption of acausal correlation in each of
these three interpretations of the EPR correlations to invoke the transition from
12A similar argument appears in Cavalcanti 2010, where Bell factorizability is imposed on the
structure of CDT (cf. (Cavalcanti 2010, Section 3.1, eq (11))). Though the details may differ,
we think our argument in this section should largely apply there as well. We think it unfair to
impose factorizability on CDT, and to do so one must impose parameter independence, outcome
independence, and the no conspiracy assumptions.
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our equation (2) from CDT, to the independent equation (3) (e.g. see Ahmed and
Caulton, p. 4316). There is an argument in their Section 4 that is supposed to
apply to CDT regardless of which of (A2), (B2) or (C2) one views as the best
acausal interpretation. They devise a betting scenario in which two outcomes—
where you bet the devices will display the same output when both set to the same
setting—will pay 1 − z, 0 ≤ z ≤ 1, while the other two—when the outputs will
differ—will pay −z. Now, given the facts of the setup (conditions 1-3 in Section 1
above, (4) and (5) in (Ahmed and Caulton 2014, p.4317)), they claim that in
calculating the expected utility using EDT, one should give zero credence to the
outcomes paying −z, while the causal decision theorist cannot rule these outcomes
out entirely based solely on the facts of the setup. Thus, depending on the exact
values of the payouts and credences, there will be a scenario in which EDT beats
CDT in this setup, because EDT reflects the facts of quantum theory in a way
that CDT somehow cannot.
Insofar as EDT is licensed to give zero credence to these outcomes based on
the past evidence, CDT should do the same.13 The experimental evidence indi-
cates that Bell-inequalities are in fact violated, and Bell (1964) proved that these
correlations cannot be causally connected in a local manner. Therefore, a causal
decision theorist with an acausal interpretation of entanglement should accept the
correlations as is, since no plausible (to them) causal mechanism would render
these correlations spurious. Ahmed and Caulton concede that one may well give
these options zero credence, and therefore argue against each of (A2), (B2), and
(C2) individually as well. We turn to these arguments next.
In Section 3, Ahmed and Caulton provide a hidden variables setup to show that
an acausal denial of the no conspiracy assumption leads to a losing setup with CDT.
However, the setup they provide is a noncontextual hidden variables theory, and
the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem rules out noncontextual hidden variable theories
for reproducing quantum entanglement (Bell 1966; Kochen and Specker 1967).
CDT does not enter the picture, since the fault lies with noncontextuality. For
their argument regarding (B2) and (C2) interpretations, they then impose four
constraints on what a causal decision theorist must presume of the chances. Since
we will need to refer to the first three in detail, they are quoted fully below.14
(i) It is surely absurd to suppose that the choice of bet between ‘het’
and ‘hom’ makes any difference to the reading on either receiver once
we are given their settings. We could in any case impose this condition
13On a Bayesian view of setting credences, these outcomes should never receive exactly zero
credence, but the past body of evidence can be made sufficiently large such that Cr(AB, het) ≈ 0.
14Ahmed and Caulton (2014) use ‘hom’ and ‘het’ to indicate cases in which the outcomes
on two receivers show the same reading (homogeneous) and different readings (hetergeneous),
respectively.
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by brute force: i.e., by requiring that you choose the kind of bet on
any given run (i.e. between ‘hom’ and ‘het’) after the run is over but
before you have had a chance to see the relevant readings. . .
(ii) Since on (B2) the readings on the receivers are causally independent
of one another, the chance of either reading on either receiver is inde-
pendent of the reading on the other receiver, even given the settings
on both receivers. . .
(iii) The reading on either receiver is causally independent of the setting
on the other receiver given its own setting. (This follows from the
assumption that there is no prior instruction set.) (Ahmed and Caulton
2014, pp. 4331-2)
From point (i), the first action they take to be causally irrelevant (and, incidentally,
evidentially irrelevant) for the outcome of the betting scenario is the agent’s choice
of bet. So far we are in agreement. In both CDT and EDT, we can define, for
example,
Ch(yAyB|1A2B) := Ch(yAyB|1A2B, het) = Ch(yAyB|1A2B, hom), (4)
the chance of outcome ‘Yes’ at A and ‘Yes’ at B given that A was set to 1 and
B was set to 2, as independent of the agent’s bet. By point (ii), we have reached
a condition on the chances that violates the assumptions of a (B2) type solution.
Condition (ii) states that, when coupled with CDT, the chances for the outcomes
at A and B should factorize, since there is no causal relationship between the two,
for example:
Ch(yAyB|1A2B) = Ch(yA|1A2B)Ch(yB|1A2B). (5)
But the B-type response is a denial of outcome independence, and (B2) is just
the stipulation that the outcome dependence is acausal. So point (ii) would be
rejected by someone taking a (B2) interpretation, before considerations of EDT
versus CDT come into play. Effectively, Ahmed and Caulton are claiming that
a causal decision theorist who denies outcome independence in quantum theory
must accept outcome independence.
Point (iii) contradicts the assumptions of the (C2) solution.15 Like point (ii)
just mentioned, point (iii) amounts to an assertion of parameter independence,
while option (C2) is a denial of parameter independence. These three assumptions
are jointly unsatisfactory for at least two of the three interpretations to which
Ahmed and Caulton intend them to apply.
15Though these conditions are brought up in the context of B-type solutions, they claim that
the same argument applies equally to (C2) solutions: “the foregoing argument of course applies
as well to them as it does to (B2)-type theories: CDT and EDT will give conflicting advice. . . to
any agent who accepts (C2)” (Ahmed and Caulton 2014, p. 4335)
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Points (i)–(iii) are sufficient to derive a Bell-inequality, which we know to be
violated by quantum systems. Neither causal nor evidential decision theorists
should accept these constraints. Further, if one does accept the constraints, then
CDT and EDT both recommend betting against the evidence. The other assump-
tion is that the randomization procedure responsible for the varying experimental
settings on repeated runs of the experiment screens off these settings from the
conditions at the source. That is, the probability distribution over experimental
settings is independent of common causes or hidden variables. This is the free will,
no conspiracy, or no retrocausality assumption (Eq 6, Ahmed and Caulton 2014).
With these assumptions in place, it follows that the expectation values of sta-
tistical correlations satisfy Bell-type inequalities. These assumptions can be tested
by performing the experiment sufficiently many times that observed frequencies
will, with high probability, be close to their expectation values. As mentioned,
violations of Bell-type inequalities are well attested in experiment, and it is widely
accepted that the assumptions that jointly entail satisfaction of these inequalities
are not all true.
In both Ahmed (2014) and Ahmed and Caulton (2014), we find a footnote
asserting that this conclusion can be evaded; though the conditions imposed on
chances suffice to derive a Bell-type inequality, it is claimed that it does not follow
that the assumptions are at odds with the predictions of quantum mechanics.
Note that points (i)–(iii) suffice to derive a Bell inequality for the Ch
function. This does not contradict the predictions of quantum mechan-
ics so long as the chances given by Ch do not reflect long-run relative
frequencies. It is permitted if, for example, Ch represents single-case
chances that vary from case to case. And that is what Ch should repre-
sent if conditional chance matters to Causal Decision Theory: for CDT
is supposed to be sensitive to the tendency of a setting to causally pro-
mote this or that outcome in the particular decision situation to which
you are applying it. The situation here is similar to that in Newcomb’s
problem, where, even though there is a long-run correlation between
one’s choosing one box and this having been predicted, the latter is, on
any occasion, conditionally independent of the former with respect to
the appropriately causal chance function. This is consistent with the
claim that chances control long run frequencies if, as in the Newcomb
case and as here, these one-off conditional chances vary from one oc-
casion to the next. (Ahmed 2014, p. 151 fn. 3; Ahmed and Caulton
2014, p. 4332 fn. 21).
If, indeed, the conclusion could be evaded so easily, this would completely under-
mine the interest in experimental tests of Bell-type inequalities, as the impetus
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of the experiments is to rule out theories satisfying the prima facie plausible as-
sumptions that lead to those inequalities. The reasons why the conclusion cannot
be evaded so easily should be apparent from what has already been said. It is
not an assumption of the analysis that the chance-functions Chλ (yAyB|AB) not
vary from case to case, and, indeed, expositions of Bell’s theorems usually explic-
itly mention that the extreme instance of this variation, the deterministic case, is
included as a special case. In the deterministic case, different outcomes in each
trial of the experiment mean that case-by-case chance functions must vary. What
is assumed is that, whatever variation there is of conditions at the source, and
consequent variation of Chλ (yAyB|AB), the experimental settings are effectively
independent of this variation, so that, if one looks at the subset of runs corre-
sponding to a given pair of settings, these constitute a fair sample of conditions
at the source. This has the consequence that the observed long-run frequencies
can be expected to approximate the average value of Chλ (yAyB|AB), where the
average is taken over the distribution of various conditions at the source. If, for
every λ, the chance-function Chλ generates expectation values that satisfy a Bell-
type inequality, then so does any average of these various chance-functions on any
distribution over λ.
As mentioned in Section 3, we suspect the root issue here is that Ahmed as-
sumes that for CDT, all causally independent events must have independent chance
distributions. This is not the case generically, even in the classical setting. In cases
of incomplete information, events that do not causally influence one another may
nevertheless be correlated. What is especially significant about quantum correla-
tions is that conditioning on common causes is not sufficient to screen correlations.
In effect, Ahmed’s argument relies on the unwarranted assumption that the causal
decision theorist is constrained to use chance functions attributable to a common
cause of the outcomes. This appears to be a denial of the possibility of lawlike (i.e.,
governing single case chances) acausal correlations. If the causal decision theorist
were truly constrained in this way, then this would indeed be a good argument
against accepting causal decision theory. However, the causal decision theorist
should use the chances predicted by quantum theory, and these chances—at least
insofar as they relate to the empirically accessible quantities—are independent of
any particular choice of interpretation. Both CDT and EDT will make the same
predictions in these experimental setups; since one’s actions are independent of
and evidentially irrelevant to the outcomes, both will use (3) to calculate expected
utility. An agent should set their credences equal to what they take the chances
to be, and the empirical evidence overwhelmingly suggests that these are given by
quantum theory. This is true regardless of questions about interpretation.
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5 Conclusion
Experimental tests of Bell-inequality violations are not situations in which eviden-
tial decision theory (EDT) and causal decision theory (CDT) diverge. In trying
to make them diverge, Ahmed imposes a strong requirement of statistical inde-
pendence on causally independent events. Perhaps the most fundamental lesson
of quantum mechanics is that this is false. As we have argued, this line of rea-
soning ignores the fact that quantum correlations, while potentially understood as
acausal, are nonetheless lawlike dependencies, which should be included in both
CDT and EDT. Nonlocality is a relationship of statistical dependence, even on
interpretations where the wings of the Bell–type experiment are causally isolated.
One of the lessons of quantum mechanics is that causation itself is not the
ultimate arbiter of when lawlike dependencies exist in nature. When one’s actions
are independent of the set of outcomes, and have no evidential import, expected
utility is equal for CDT and EDT. An agent should set their credences in line
with what she believes the objective chances to be. The experimental evidence
overwhelmingly suggests that the objective chances are in agreement with the
predictions of quantum theory.
Entanglement phenomena make clear that there are lawlike correlations that
are not straightforwardly causal. The fact that the structure of the physical de-
pendencies in the world is more complex than we knew prior to the discovery of
the EPR correlations, does not entail that there are not relevant lawlike depen-
dencies for the application of CDT. Causal decision theory is a framework within
which to make decisions, and does not impose constraints on the chances that
the world may provide one with. Given the success of quantum theory, a rational
agent should take the chances it predicts into account when betting on Bell-type
experiments, and causal decision theory does not prohibit one’s doing so.
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